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Abstract 
The study aims to examine the efficiency aspects of the international carbon market, with a focus on 
economic impacts on the European energy system, by analyzing the sectoral Marginal Abatements 
Cost Curves (MACC) and the trading under different global carbon market configurations in 2010 and 
in 2020. To produce a consistent and realistic assessment we employ sources such as: second NAPs 
under ETS, GHG National Inventories, EIA data and POLES world energy model to constitute the 
sectoral base year and 2010, 2020 emission levels in different countries and regions. We then use the 
market analysis tool ASPEN, which enables to derive supply and demand from sectoral MACCs 
produced with POLES model, and to evaluate the economic impacts on the carbon market 
participants. The paper shows in particular that in compliance with 2020 emission reduction targets, 
the benefits of an extended carbon market gain importance since more than 50% of the reduction 
target is achieved by ETS sectors and especially electricity sector. Furthermore, the new flexibility 
margins provided by a longer time-period for the adjustment of investments in new generation 
capacities compensates for the increasing pressure towards stronger emission reductions. 
Keywords: emission trading; international carbon market; CO2 price 
 
Introduction 
International cooperation through the market-based Kyoto Protocol mechanisms is crucially important 
for greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) abatement policies if in the future a significant number of 
countries remain subject to a system of emission quotas, in a “cap and trade” regulation system 
(Criqui, 2002). The European Union was the first region to set up a broad carbon market: the 
European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS, thereafter referred to as ETS), which started 
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7functioning by the first of January 2005
1. Additionally, the European Parliament adopted the “linking 
directive”
2 which opens the ETS to other carbon trading systems as well as to Kyoto “project-based” 
mechanisms, i.e. the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)
3. The CDM 
and JI are considered to be a key option to engage countries outside the EU in the international 
climate change process and in the emerging international carbon market
4. 
Given the size already reached by the ETS, the system could constitute the very heart of the global 
carbon market for many years and serve as a reference for other markets. Furthermore and in parallel 
with the ETS policy, the European Commission proposes a quantity objective of 20% reduction of 
GHG emissions in Europe in 2020 based on the 1990 emission levels, which might be extended to 
30% reduction if an international agreement justifies (Council of the EU, 2007). It thus clearly shows its 
commitment to long term actions aiming at stabilization in GHG concentrations. 
Meanwhile, the value of the global emission markets might be as high as € 200 billion by 2010 
according to the leading carbon market analyst Point Carbon (2004). Besides the growing popularity of 
CDM and JI projects, the domestic cap-and-trade systems are under discussion or already operate in 
Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Japan and several states of America (Angers, 2006). In that context, 
the estimation of CO2 prices for 2010 and beyond is becoming a key risk-management issue for utility 
analysts. While a number of modeling teams have tried to project the prices for GHG emissions in 
2010 and in 2020, the levels found differ widely, from $3 to $74/tCO2. This is basically because of 
different business-as-usual emissions projections and of differentiated models’ design features 
(Springer and Varilkek, 2004, ICF, 2005, Anger, 2006). As an example, Klepper and Peterson (2004) 
use a computable general equilibrium model of the European Union to quantify the various 
consequences of a range of likely schemes for the implementation of NAPs (National Allocation Plans 
under the ETS). The analysis of the simulation results highlights a number of interesting details in 
terms of aggregate allowance trade-flows between member countries, of allowance prices, so as in 
terms of the role of the accession countries in the ETS. The efficiency aspects of international carbon 
market as well as economy-wide competitiveness effects are further on elaborated in Alexeeva-Talebi 
and Angers (2007).   
Our study complements the researches on the efficiency aspects of the carbon market, with a focus 
on economic impacts on the European energy system, by analyzing the sectoral marginal abatements 
cost curves and the trading under different global carbon market configurations. A static and 
competitive equilibrium environment is assumed given a set of worldwide sectoral targets by country in 
2010 and 2020. A number of variables have a significant impact on the fundamentals of the demand 
                                                       
1 Directive 2003/87/EC. 
2 Directive 2004/101/EC. 
3 In the analytical results given in this paper, “JI” countries refer to: Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro. “CDM” countries refer to all non-Annex B 
countries of the Kyoto Protocol. 









































7and supply of carbon allowances. Thus in this type of exercise, a whole set of reasonable and 
consistent hypotheses have to be formulated, including:  
-  the tightness of the sectoral objectives in the ETS system, which to a large extent refers in this 
exercise to the formal or implicit second NAPs, and to other carbon trading systems; 
-  the ‘hot air’ influence, which can be defined as emissions credits resulting from above-the-
reference emission targets, especially from Russia and Ukraine
5, and the availability of credits 
from JI projects; 
-  the availability and costs of credits originating from CDM projects. 
To explore the economic impacts of various organizations of global carbon markets and key variables 
mentioned above, we use the market analysis tool ASPEN, which enables to derive supply and 
demand from sectoral Marginal Abatement Cost Curves (MACC) produced with the reference scenario 
of POLES world energy model. ASPEN then computes the market-equilibrium price, the flows of 
CDM/JI credits, the quantities exchanged and the reduction costs for each country in each sector for 
different global carbon market configurations. 
The paper develops along the following: in section 1, we first describe the approach chosen for 
sectoral endowments of CO2 emission allowances for different countries or regions in 2010 and 2020; 
in section 2, we actually display and discuss the marginal abatement costs curves derived from 
POLES Reference scenario; then in section 3, we proceed with the ASPEN software and introduce the 
five scenarios representing consistent configurations of the future carbon market; section 4 later 
delivers and analyses the main results of this study; lastly, we present our main conclusions in section 
5. The paper shows in particular that in compliance with 2020 emission reduction targets, the benefits 
of an extended carbon market gain importance since more than 50% of the reduction target is 
achieved by ETS sectors and especially electricity sector. Furthermore, the new flexibility margins 
provided by a longer time-period for the adjustment of investments in new generation capacities 
compensates for the increasing pressure towards stronger emission reductions. 
1 THE SECTORAL CO2 ALLOCATIONS FOR 2010 AND 2020 
The assumptions that influence the demand and supply of allowances are major elements for the 
assessment of the carbon price. The countries, regions and sectors of POLES world energy model 
described in Annex 1, define the participants to the carbon market in our exercise. We take into 
account 25 European countries, 11 Annex B countries or regions and 16 non-Annex B countries or 
                                                       
5 Excess permits that have occurred due to economic collapse or declined production for reasons not directly 










































6. In this exercise, only the energy-related CO2 emissions are taken into account and the detail 
of their sectoral representation is shown in the Table 1. 
Table 1 : Sectoral identification of CO2 emissions 
Sectors
Sub-sectors Chemistry Metals Minerals Others Electricity Other transf. Road Aviation Others Residential Services Others
EU 25 vv v vv vv v v v v v
Rest of Annex B
Non-Annex B vv v v
vv v v
Industry Energy Transport Others
 
National Inventories, which have to be annually submitted by the parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), provide a detailed sub-sectoral representation 
of CO2 emissions in a common format. We used these inventories to establish the base year (usually 
1990) sub-sectoral emissions, whenever possible. For the countries or regions that do not produce 
such inventories, we use statistics from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).  
1.1 CO2 allowances for EU 25: 2010 and 2020 
The fact that European countries – along with the other parties who ratified the Kyoto protocol – do 
have legal obligations to fulfill their objectives in the period 2008-2012, provides part of the 
assumptions on the allocations in 2010: these assumptions have to fit with the reduction objectives 
under the Kyoto protocol. Additionally, the national reduction obligation has to be split domestically 
between the ETS and non-ETS sectors – like transport, buildings and small industries (see Table 1). 
The distribution among the sectors appears to be very important since generous endowments in the 
ETS sectors will imply higher abatement costs for the non-ETS sectors (and vice-versa), as long as 
the Kyoto objectives are strictly met.  
The starting point for the sectoral CO2 emissions distribution was the establishment of a database of 
the NAPs for the second phase of the ETS in 2008-2012
7. As for the non-ETS sectors, the latest 
national GHG emission inventories were employed to constitute their sub-sectoral shares to be 
inserted in the CO2 emission quota for 2010, as allowed by national Kyoto targets.  
Concerning the post-Kyoto period, a number of countries have already signaled that their domestic 
initiatives will have a lifetime well beyond 2012, clearly indicating that carbon emissions will have a 
cost (and reductions a value) also from 2013 onwards (Point Carbon, 2007). Additionally, the 
European Commission in its Strategic Energy Review package of 2007 proposed a 20% reduction of 
the GHG emissions by 2020, for which, according to the Commission, the key economic instrument 
will remain the ETS. Taking into consideration these propositions we assume a 20% reduction of CO2 
emissions in 2020 relative to 1990 and with sectoral endowment proportions as in 2010. Additionally 
the burden-sharing scheme we used for the 20% reduction in 2020 in EU-25 is based on the study 
                                                       
6 Countries defined as in Kyoto protocol. 










































7performed by the German Institute for Economic Research (2007), presented in Annex 2. The 
resulting sub-sectoral CO2 allowances for EU-25 are summarized in the Table 2.  
Table 2: Assumptions on sub-sectoral CO2 allowances in EU-25 in 2010 and 2020 
Mt CO2 % Mt CO2 % Mt CO2 %M t  C O 2%
Chemistry 128 106 86 76 -42 -33 -52 -41 -20 -19% -30 -28%
Ferrous metals 222 151 221 196 -1 0 -26 -12 70 46% 45 30%
Minerals 330 289 281 255 -49 -15 -75 -23 -7 -2% -34 -12%
Others 102 103 79 69 -23 -22 -33 -32 -24 -23% -34 -33%
782 649 668 596 -115 -15 -186 -24 19 3% -53 -8%
Electricity 1348 1292 1156 1013 -192 -14 -335 -25 -135 -10% -279 -22%
Other transf. 248 217 164 147 -84 -34 -101 -41 -54 -25% -70 -32%
1595 1509 1320 1160 -276 -17 -435 -27 -189 -13% -349 -23%
Road 694 875 832 715 137 20 21 3 -43 -5% -160 -18%
Aviation 18 24 19 17 1 8 -1 -5 -4 -18% -7 -28%
Others 40 39 40 33 0 0 -7 -17 1 2% -6 -15%
752 938 891 765 139 18 13 2 -47 -5% -173 -18%
Residential 527 474 484 418 -42 -8 -109 -21 10 2% -56 -12%
Services 200 187 183 158 -17 -9 -42 -21 -4 -2% -29 -15%
Others 107 77 87 74 -20 -19 -33 -31 10 13% -3 -4%
834 738 754 650 -79 -10 -184 -22 16 2% -88 -12%
3963 3833 3633 3171 -331 -8 -792 -20 -200 -5% -662 -17% Total Energy












 (base year-Kyoto)  (base year-2020)  (2004-Kyoto)  (2004-2020)
 
According to Table 2, Kyoto objectives for European countries represent a shortfall of 331 Mt CO2 and 
the target assumptions for 2020 correspond to a reduction of 793 Mt CO2 relative to the base year 
emission levels. However, if applying the 2004 national GHG emissions inventories, we see the Kyoto 
shortfall shrinking to 200 MtCO2 in 2010 and to 662 MtCO2 in 2020. It’s indeed not a secret that the 
major contribution to the reduction of the shortfall is a consequence of the reunification of East and 
West Germany and of the consequent phasing out of coal. In parallel, the massive introduction of 
North Sea gas in UK in the 1990s also played a significant role (Kolstad, 2005). The table above 
indicates as well that the largest reductions in absolute quantities in 2010 and 2020 should be 
accomplished in the electricity sector, while the highest emissions increases relative to the base year 
are in the road transport sector. We notice as well that the European Industry of ferrous metals in 
principle benefits of a generous allocation in 2010 and 2020 relative to its 2004 CO2 emissions level.  
1.2 CO2 allowances for the rest Annex B and non-Annex B countries: 2010 
and 2020 
In the same way as for the European countries, the key assumption of binding Kyoto objectives also 
applies to the rest of Annex B countries that ratified the treaty. Concerning the post-Kyoto period 
(2020), we assume that their climate change policy will lead to a 10% reduction compared to the 2010 
emission level, i.e. a 12.2% reduction compared to the base-year level of these countries. To simplify 
the approach for CO2 emissions distribution across sectors in 2010 and 2020, we apply the sectoral 
shares that appear in the latest national GHG emission inventories. This approach might, however, not 
fully correspond to the allocative efficiency for future reduction options between sectors. 
The countries that refused the protocol, notably the USA and Australia, have indeed presented 
policies to combat climate change, but in the absence of binding quantitative targets, the emission 









































7trade systems expressed in several states, combined with the pressure for a federal cap-and-trade 
system, will result in the USA becoming a full member of the global carbon market in 2020. Thus, for 
our study we constrain the CO2 emissions in USA and Australia by imposing an extended proposal of 
senators McCain and Lieberman, i.e. stabilizing the CO2 emissions in 2020 relative to 1990 level
8 
(Pizer and Kopp, 2003). 
Observing the international debates on global climate policy, the development of non-Annex B 
countries is not expected to be carbon-constrained until 2020, even though certain climate policies 
and measures are already in place in some of these countries
9. Our study assumes that the level and 
sectoral distribution of CO2 emissions in 2010 and 2020 for non-Annex B countries follows the 
developments of POLES Reference scenario. The Figure 1 summarizes our set of hypothesis for CO2 
sectoral emission endowments in 2010 and 2020 for the different countries and regions of the world. 























Rest of annex B USA+Austr.
Non annex B
 
Looking at Figure 1 we notice that, in spite of the emission reductions that are imposed in many 
regions, the global CO2 emissions increase by more than half relative to the base-year level, and by 
18% relative to the 2010 level. This considerable growth in CO2 emissions is explained principally by 
the doubling of emissions levels in non-Annex B countries, as a result of the absence of carbon 
constraints in these rapidly growing regions.  
                                                       
8 According to the proposal of McCain-Lieberman, during the first six years of the program (2010-2016), annual 
GHG emissions would be limited to the amount released in 2000 and in subsequent years, the limit would be 
reduced to the 1990 emissions levels. 
9 With the recent passage of China's new Renewable Energy Law, China's government imposed a national 
renewable energy requirement that is expected to boost the use of renewable energy capacity up to 10% by 2020 









































7In this section, we defined the sectoral and country or region based CO2 emissions endowments for 
2010 and 2020. Besides the fundamental analysis of the demand and supply in the carbon market, 
other factors might as well influence the volatility and liquidity of the market in the real world. These 
include: other GHG emissions besides CO2, permits allocation methods, weather or wind factors, as 
well as market structure in each country or market power and strategic behaviors. These issues are 
not covered in this paper but for strategic behavior for instance, one can refer for instance to Rousse, 
2004 and Schwartz, 2005.  
2 MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS CURVES 
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the sectoral marginal abatement cost curves (MACC) 
derived from POLES model. After a short methodological explanation we describe and comment the 
anticipated MACCs for key sectors in the energy system and for several European countries as well 
as for the whole EU-25.  
 
Methodology for MACC 
POLES model basically simulates energy and environment policies through the introduction of a 
shadow tax for the considered emissions. In the case of CO2 emission reduction policies, the shadow 
carbon tax is introduced in every module where fossil fuels are burnt, proportionally to their carbon 
content. This shadow carbon tax can represent either an actual carbon tax, the price of an emission 
permit or also the dual cost of a technical standard or Policy and Measure. It is thus denominated with 
a generic term: the Carbon Value (CV), which represents the cost accepted by society for reducing 
one ton of CO2 (Criqui and Mima, 2001).  
The marginal abatement costs curves are technically obtained by successive simulations of POLES 
Reference scenario with stepwise increases in CV from 2005 until 2020, illustrating the progressive 
introduction of climate change policy. These simulations allow building the MACCs for CO2, which can 
then be identified either at the sub-sectoral, sectoral, national or regional level. The marginal cost of 
decreasing emissions varies enormously across sectors, as well as countries as shown in the next 
sub-section.  
 
Marginal abatement costs curves by several European countries and sectors 
The large number of European countries makes it difficult to represent the MACCs for all sectors and 
countries. Therefore we chose three representative European countries: France, Germany and UK, as 
well as the total of EU-25 and four sectors in the energy system: Industry, Energy, Transport and 
Others (see Table 1)
10. The following figures show the value of carbon that allows reaching the 
                                                       









































7national Kyoto and 2020 objectives as well as the sectoral reductions that will be implied for the MAC 
equalization. The presentation adopted in Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows emissions reduction levels with 
an increasing carbon value in 2010 and 2020 relative to the base year emission levels.  
The total MAC curve in Figure 2 indicates that reaching Kyoto objectives for the countries considered 
requires a carbon price well above 42€/tCO2. However, at the European level, this CO2 price is 
sufficient to reach the Kyoto objectives, mainly due to the low or zero cost reductions in new accession 
countries. The MAC curve for Industry stays on the right of the target line for each three European 
countries as well as for the total of EU-25, signifying that Industry’s emissions are projected to be low, 
even in the reference case. This identifies Industry as a potential seller on the permit market, 
especially if the endowments under the ETS are not stringent (see Table 2). We perceive as well that 
the MAC curve in the Transport sector is rocketing in all countries representing a very low elasticity to 
carbon price and expensive reductions in the short term. The reductions in the Others sector appear to 
be less costly comparing to the Transport sector or even close to zero cost for some countries 
including Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the new member countries. However, the Others 
curve is showing a low elasticity to carbon price meaning that further emission reductions in this sector 
might be expensive once the low cost reductions are exploited. Meanwhile, the reductions in the 
Energy sector, where the principle emissions come from the electricity sector, seem costly in the short 
term, but at the same time flexible and reacting highly to the carbon value increases because of the 
switching opportunities from coal to gas. 
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7Figure 3 extends the presentation of the MACCs until 2020. We notice right away the crooked form of 
the Energy’s curve confirming the sector’s ability to swiftly respond to increases in carbon price, with 
threshold effects. The longer time period enables to account for adjustments through investments in 
low carbon technologies and even induces the development of carbon capture and sequestration 
technologies. The carbon prices needed to induce such radical changes depend largely on the 
sensitivity of the different countries’ power industries to the CO2 price and ranges from 18€/tCO2 in 
Germany, to 37€/tCO2 in UK and to 48€/tCO2 in France. We observe as well the apparent zero-cost 
position of Industry’s curve compared to the average target; no carbon policy is needed to reduce the 
emissions in industry sectors, but the statement depends of course from the stringency of the CO2 
endowments (see Table 2).  
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Before analyzing the carbon market under different market configurations, one can take a look at the 
national marginal abatement cost (MAC) for reaching Kyoto and 2020 emissions reduction targets in 
the European countries (Figure 4). In terms of domestic reduction possibilities, Figure 4 provides us 
with a good indication on which countries are meeting the targets easily and which will have to seek 
for cheaper reduction alternatives via ETS or Kyoto project-based mechanisms. The Kyoto and 2020 
targets are costless for almost all new member countries apart Slovenia. The trading will obviously 
profit these countries. The highest costs for complying with Kyoto targets are incurred by Spain, 









































7The greater reduction effort in 2020 implies higher MACs for all European countries except the 
majority of new member countries. The MACs increase significantly for France and for Sweden and, to 
a lesser extent, but still by a factor more than 2, for Germany and Belgium. The fairly high national 
MACs show the importance of the ETS, especially when industry and power sector bear an important 
part of the effort, and the necessity for the carbon market to be extended to the rest of the world 
regions. This is analyzed further down in Section   4. 






















After exposing the differences in the MACs between countries and sectors, the next section defines 
the configurations of the potential global carbon market and introduces the ASPEN software for its 
analysis.  
3 ASPEN: THE ANALYSIS OF CARBON MARKETS  
ASPEN is an analytical model that uses the MAC curves produced by POLES model as inputs for the 
simulation − on simple but robust micro-economic grounds – of tradable emission quotas systems. 
The principle used is one of cost-minimization through trading: if a set of economic actors – sub-
sectors, sectors, countries or regions, each characterized by its own MAC curve and emission 
constraint − participates in an emission trading market, then the price of the allowance will equalize, 
through the process of exchanges, the Marginal Abatement Cost for each participant (Criqui and 
Mima, 2001). The demand and supply of the CO2 allowances is defined in function of sectoral 
endowments for each country, as described in section   1.  
ASPEN differentiates emissions sources along the sectoral coverage of POLES model (see Table 1). 
For any given market configuration (countries, participating sectors, levels of constraint, presence of 
CDM reductions or ‘hot air’), the model produces global allowances supply and demand curves. It then 









































7country, the flows of JI and CDM credits. It calculates as well the national total abatement cost with 
and without trading. The results are discussed in section   4, but it is first needed to define the 
scenarios and variants of the global carbon market.  
3.1  Defining the carbon markets: five scenarios 
Undertaking an analysis of the supply and demand for CO2 allowances in 2010 and 2020 involves a 
number of hypotheses, for which political decisions are yet to be taken. The principal variables on the 
supply side are (i) the availability of Kyoto mechanisms’ project-based credits as well as (ii) the role of 
‘hot air’ in the carbon market. ‘Hot air’ in our study refers principally to the above-the-reference 
emission targets especially in Russia and Ukraine, but it also includes other countries where the 
targeted levels happen to be higher than POLES model Reference scenario’s emissions levels. As for 
the demand side, it may vary for reasons of CO2 endowments stringency or of increased/decreased 
participation in the carbon market of Annex B countries. 
To analyze the future carbon market we identified five scenarios, representing different configurations 
(Table 3). The first scenario corresponds to the actual ETS where the carbon market is dominated by 
European electricity and industry sectors. The utilisation of credits from CDM projects might alleviate 
European emissions reduction efforts in the second scenario. Furthermore, the lower cost reduction 
opportunities via JI projects in the industry and the power sector are presented in the third scenario. 
The fourth scenario extends the third by including cap-and-trade systems in Japan, Canada, 
Switzerland, Norway and Iceland in 2010 and adding USA and Australia in 2020. The trading activities 
in the first four scenarios cover only electricity and industry sectors. Finally, the fifth scenario includes 
the participation of all countries and all sectors.  
Table 3: Scenarios* 
Countries / Regions EU 25
Opening to CDM 
non-Annex B




Inclusion of Rest 
Annex B
All countries










*RCEU - Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro 
However, before finalizing the scenarios, two additional factors, i.e. the ‘hot air’ presence and the 
availability of CDM and JI projects, ought to be discussed. It is well accepted that the climate 
protection benefits anticipated in the Kyoto targets would be threatened by a combination of weak 









































7‘hot air’ reduces the need for domestic action. Therefore, a number of countries have now committed 
themselves to not purchasing ‘hot air’ allowances; these include Canada, Germany and Netherlands 
(Karmali et al, 2005). As for CDM projects, a large part of their theoretical potentials should be 
excluded due to high transaction costs explained by the lack of information or skilled personnel, 
political or economical obstacles, trade barriers or general politics of the developing country. 
Nevertheless, the expectations for credits are high and justified. According to OECD, by the middle of 
2006 there were already more than one thousand CDM projects in the pipeline,
11 with an estimated 
GHG emission reduction potential of 146 MtCO2-eq/year in the commitment period (Ellis and 
Karousakis, 2006). Meanwhile, the institutional processes associated with JI projects are rather slow; 
by the end of 2006, there were only 20 MtCO2 of verified JI credits (Point Carbon, 2007).  
Hence, in addition to the description of scenarios in Table 3, we make the following assumptions; first 
the availability of theoretical CDM potentials in the market is set at 15% in 2010 and 2020, second, 
two variants over the presence of ‘hot air’ in the market are chosen: 0% or 50% in 2010 and 0% or 
100% in 2020. 
4 RESULTS 
The resulting various configurations of the carbon market open up a diversity of interesting results. In 
presenting them, we begin with the carbon price associated with the five scenarios listed in Table 3. 
Later on, we analyze the sectoral allowance trade for the representative European countries as well as 
for the total of EU-25 under a limited number of realistic carbon market configurations in 2010 and 
2020. The associated costs of trading in compliance with objectives are then discussed for key 
European countries and key Annex B and non-Annex B countries.  
4.1  Associated CO2 allowance price in an international carbon market in 2010 
and 2020 
The carbon price for 2010 and 2020 is derived from the carbon supply and demand analysis under the 
five scenarios listed in Table 3. Figure 5 demonstrates an example of such an analysis for 2010, 
where a good picture of the changing size of the market is provided under the various scenarios as 
more sectors and more countries participate. 
                                                       
11 Defined here as projects that have developed a project design document, and/or that have received approval 









































7Figure 5: International carbon market under five scenarios, outlook for 2010 
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In these different market configurations, the price of CO2 rises and falls, according to the changes in 
global supply and global demand that reflect the progressive widening of the market. Figure 6 displays 
the carbon prices under the five scenarios for 2010 and 2020, while taking into consideration the 
hypotheses for the key variables described in sub-section   3.1. 
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•  With a limited participation of the actors in the first scenario as only European electricity and 
industry sectors (ETS) operate on the CO2 market, we might expect the carbon prices to settle at 
39 €/tCO2. Such price level is a result of increasing national marginal abatements costs in Europe 
combined with the absence of an extended international carbon market. The reference scenario 
results comparing to the CO2 emissions endowment assumptions indicate a shortfall of 295 
MtCO2 in ETS in 2010. The Kyoto target shortfall in non-ETS sectors is, however, more important 
(383 MtCO2) indicating that the benefits from the international carbon market might be 









































7•  As for 2020, the EC objective of 20% reduction over the European energy sector creates more 
constraints for the ETS than non-ETS sectors; shortfalls of 646 MtCO2 and 595 MtCO2 
respectively, and emphasizes the important benefits that could be gained from the international 
carbon market. If the ETS remains an isolated system under the conditions of the first scenario 
until 2020, then we might see carbon prices climbing up to 58 €/tCO2, which is the highest carbon 
price level in 2020 among all the scenarios. The competitiveness issues for the European 
Industries, which have already been raised for the existing ETS, will surely be a serious argument 
against the existence of such isolated system (Reinaud, 2004, Egenhoffer and Fujiwara, 2006, 
Demailly et al, 2007). 
Scenario 2 
•  Under the second scenario, the key variable for lowering the carbon price is of course the 
availability of CDM credits in the market. With 15% of theoretical potentials of CDM projects in 
2010, the price drops down to 14 €/tCO2. The resulting quantity of CDM credits is equivalent to 
what has been projected by OECD; 146 MtCO2-eq/year in the commitment period of 2008-2012 
(Ellis and Karousakis, 2006)
12.  
•  In 2020, the increasing reduction constraints in ETS sectors raises the carbon price to 25 €/tCO2 
even though the quantity of CDM credits doubles, representing 347 MtCO2 at the market 
equilibrium.  
Scenario 3 
•  Under the third scenario, the reduction efforts of the ETS participants are furthermore facilitated 
with the access to JI projects. In 2010, the equilibrium carbon price shrinks to 7 €/tCO2, at which 
the proportion in the supply of credits is 82 MtCO2 for JI and 133 MtCO2 for CDM. It should 
however be mentioned that ‘hot air’ in the electricity and industry sectors of the JI host countries 
(besides the JI host countries in EU-25) accounts for 228 MtCO2. The overall European demand 
might be dampened once more than 35% of ‘hot air’ becomes available on the market in 2010. 
Consequently, the carbon price falls to zero and the market becomes senseless as the overall 
environmental objective is reached without any effort. Of course it is highly unlikely that Russia 
will give for free its allowances attached to ‘hot air’, automatically limiting its amount on the 
market. 
•  The carbon price attains 20 €/tCO2 in 2020 with the supply of 141 MtCO2 of JI and 277 MtCO2 of 
CDM credits at the market equilibrium. Demand for the permits growths slightly on the market due 
to increasing carbon constraints in JI host countries, which, for their reduction objectives in 2020, 
                                                       
12 Following the recent decision of EC to include the aviation sector in the ETS from 2011, we performed 
additional calculations in order to evaluate the impacts of this decision on the carbon market (Carbon Finance, 
2007). If we consider the configuration of the second scenario, where the carbon market is composed of existing 
ETS plus 15% of theoretical potential of CDM projects, the inclusion of aviation in the ETS, in our case in 2010, 
raises the shortfall of allowances by additional 129 MtCO2. The increased demand sends bullish signals to the 
carbon market raising the CO2 price from 14 €/tCO2 without aviation to 20 €/tCO2 with aviation. The supply of 
CDM credits also becomes more important providing around 203 MtCO2 at the market equilibrium instead of 146 









































7could be referred more as to ex-JI countries. Hence, the investment trend diminishes equally in JI 
projects compared to CDM projects.  
Scenario 4 
•  Under the fourth scenario, the bullish carbon price trends dominate the market due to the linking 
of cap-and-trade systems worldwide: Japan, Canada, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. The 
additional demand for allowances in the rest of Annex B countries (393 MtCO2) rises the carbon 
price up to 17 €/tCO2 in 2010. Under the new market equilibrium, the supply from project-based 
credits grows to 241 MtCO2 for JI and 163 MtCO2 for CDM projects. However, the inclusion of 
50% of ‘hot air’, originating largely from Russia and Ukraine, weights a lot on the carbon price, 
reducing it to 5 €/tCO2.  
•  The inclusion of USA and Australia in the carbon market in 2020 adds around 1593 MtCO2 to the 
existing demand pushing the price up to 37 €/tCO2. CDM projects continue to take over the JI 
projects in the long run with a distribution of 516 and 336 MtCO2 in the supply of credits 
respectively under the new equilibrium.  
Scenario 5 
•  Under the market conditions of the rather speculative fifth scenario, the carbon price rises to 
30 €/tCO2 in 2010 and doubles to 57 €/tCO2 in 2020. The introduction of carbon constraints for the 
other sectors, specially the transport sector that bears high marginal abatement costs, contributes 
strongly to the rise in the CO2 price. The impacts of ‘hot air’ on the CO2 price are very apparent in 
2010 while they are quite marginal in 2020 because of growing constraints in ex-JI countries. 
From the hypotheses and results of the scenarios, it appears to us that the second scenario should be 
considered as the most likely for 2010, so as the fourth for 2020. The two following sections provide 
further analyses on some economic impacts of these two scenarios for the participants in the carbon 
market. 
4.2  The second scenario and the international carbon market for 2010 
Taking into consideration a rapid rise of CDM projects - an increase of almost 50% between 
December 2005 and May 2006 -, we chose the second scenario for a more detailed analysis of the 
carbon market in 2010, which includes the current ETS and credits from CDM projects with an 
availability factor of 15%. Table 4 summarizes the results for the second scenario in terms of sectoral 









































7Table 4: Allowance trade-flows and reduction costs under the second scenario – 2010 
(negative values: sale of permit) 
Electricity Industry Electricity Industry Electricity Industry
France 8 0 8 0 0 0 52 52
Germany 68 0 35 4 33 -4 915 667
UK 60 9 12 5 48 5 2955 864
Italy 6 13 6 3 0 10 337 209
Rest of Europe 115 16 68 9 47 8 5385 1280
257 39 129 21 128 18 9644 3072
China 47 28 51% 51% -635
India 11 6 12% 10% -137
Rest Asia 16 7 18% 13% -172
Latin America 3 3 4% 6% -53
Africa+Middle East 11 9 12% 16% -169
Turkey 3 2 4% 3% -40



















From Table 4 we notice that the emissions reduction burden in ETS belongs largely to the electricity 
sector: 257 MtCO2 compared with a burden of 39 MtCO2 in the industry sector. Clearly, the 
purchases of credits via Kyoto project-based mechanisms constitute an important part of the 
compliance (49%) since in the short term, power generation capacities are fixed and only the fuel and 
capacity switching opportunities can be exploited. The result is however not very compatible with the 
import limits on project-based credits into ETS set by European countries in their second national 
allocation plans. For example, France’s limit on credits import into ETS is 17.9 MtCO2 while in our 
study domestic reductions in France are sufficient to comply with ETS. The quantities of credits set in 
Italian and German NAPs are also too generous according to our market fundamental analysis; out of 
29.4 MtCO2 fixed in Italian NAP2 only 10.4 MtCO2 would be necessary and out of 54 MtCO2 fixed in 
German NAP2 only 29 MtCO2 would be needed. The contrary is true for UK where credits purchases 
account for 52 MtCO2 in our study while the allowable limit in NAP2 is only 19.7 MtCO2.  
The reductions, even though less important, are still necessary in the overall industry sector of the 
ETS. However, the domestic reductions in Europe, favored by the low or zero cost marginal 
abatement curves for industry as seen in Figure 2, outweigh the purchases for the Kyoto projects-
based credits in this sector. The picture is quite similar for the European electricity sector even though 
the objectives are high. The marginal abatement costs appear to be low enough as to induce an 
additional reduction besides the compliance with ETS power sector targets in countries like Greece, 
Portugal, Belgium, Finland, Ireland and the new member countries except Slovenia and Poland.  
The economic effectiveness of emission trading, when the marginal abatement costs are equalized 
across actors and only the least-cost reductions are undertaken, is quantified in the last two columns 
of Table 4. The cost without carbon market highly exceeds the cost with trading for compliance with 
ETS targets for all European countries, by up to a factor of four for some countries (UK for instance). 
The UK and Germany keep the highest costs, even though the trading smoothes the differences with 
other countries. Conversely, France has a relatively low effort for reaching its objective (for industry 









































7The gains of the carbon market are highly differentiated for the CDM host countries, clearly benefiting 
to only some of them, China in particular.  Asia provides the largest part – 81% of the total of CDM 
credits, far more than Africa-Middle East with 12% or Latin America and Turkey with only 8%. We 
remind from Figure 6, that without this quantity of CDM credits (146 MtCO2), the CO2 price might 
climb to 39€/tCO2 for the existing ETS in 2010, while the imports of credits reduce the price by more 
than two, to 14€/tCO2.  
4.3  The fourth scenario and the international carbon market for 2020 
The latest statements from the EU-Council suggest that “the EU emissions trading scheme is and will 
remain one of the most important instruments for the region’s effort to curb GHG emissions and 
meeting the objective of limiting the global average temperature increases to not more than 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels” (Point Carbon, 2007). The Council equally evokes the importance of linking the 
comparable cap-and-trade systems worldwide as well as the necessity of a continued recognition 
beyond 2012 of credits from project-based mechanisms. Thus, for the analysis of the carbon market in 
2020, we chose the fourth scenario, which best reflects the Council statements. It includes the 
participation of European industries and power sector, the increases of CDM credits on the market, 
the participation of ex-JI countries and lastly, the involvement of the rest Annex B countries with USA 
and Australia. Table 5 resumes the results of this fourth scenario. 
Table 5: Allowance trade flows and reduction costs under the 4
th scenario – 2020 (negative 
value: sale, gain) 
Electricity Industry Electricity Industry Electricity Industry
France 85 0 25 6 61 -6 8100 2803
Germany 210 0 110 8 99 -8 8168 5868
UK 91 17 51 10 40 7 4415 3195
I t a l y 2 241 57 7- 3 6 8 6 6 5 5
Rest of Europe 171 45 170 37 1 7 6699 3335
580 66 371 67 208 -1 28068 15856
USA+RJAN* 1573 20 1240 108 333 -88 35063 33724
Canada 165 26 73 8 92 18 13426 5584
Japan 343 144 153 56 190 88 27430 14449
Rest of Annex B 11 0 3 0 7 0 941 344
2092 190 1469 172 623 17 76860 54101
China 170 78 46% 53% -4795
India 37 18 10% 12% -1115
Rest Asia 66 19 18% 13% -1662
Latin America 30 9 8% 6% -688
Africa+Middle East 64 24 17% 16% -1619
367 149 -367 -149 -9879
ex JI Russia 0 0 232 52 -95% -56% 0 -5998
152 6 396 99 -244 -93 1356 -7159
Total EU25




















*RJAN – Australia and New Zealand 
As in 2010, the CO2 emission endowment we assumed in sub-section 1.1 seems to favor the 









































7this shortfall is practically entirely covered by the domestic reductions favored by the low marginal 
abatement costs curves for industry shown in Figure 3. Contrary to the industry sector, the European 
electricity sector is extremely short of allowances by 580 MtCO2. The electricity sector alone is 
carrying almost half of the reduction burden needed for all European energy system in 2020 (the 
reductions account for 595 MtCO2 in non-ETS sectors). Thus, the import of CDM/JI credits into the 
ETS electricity sector increases, but less than the domestic reductions do. The longer time period 
provides wider domestic reduction opportunities through the adjustment of less polluting investments.  
Germany displays a strong demand for allowances in its electricity sector. Consequently, the 
emissions reductions appear to be the most expensive for Germany among the rest of European 
countries as it is shown in the last two columns of Table 5.  This might be explained by the electricity 
generation mix, which, in the absence of a significant increase in renewable electricity, is dominated 
by more efficient, but still highly polluting coal plants, requiring more allowances. This come-back of 
coal is mostly explained by the phasing out of existing nuclear facilities, which is supposed to occur by 
2025. Reduction costs for France increase significantly compared to 2010 because of limited 
abatement opportunities due its initial nuclear capacities. However, the trade of permits allowed by the 
carbon market reduces the reduction costs by a factor of three, and along with UK, the reduction costs 
remain relatively low, i.e. in the range of comparable European countries. The new member countries 
can still reduce domestically more than required by the objectives in 2020 and benefit from exports on 
nt for Canada and Japan, decreasing their reductions costs by 
uce more than their objectives: Russia and Ukraine are 
particularly important net sellers of credits.  
5 CONCLUSION 
emission levels in different countries and regions. However, the market fundamentals analysis is also 
the carbon market.  
The longer time-horizon (2020), allows the renewal of carbon intensive capital in the power sector of 
USA, providing considerable domestic reductions. The weak targets for industry in the USA make the 
domestic reductions easily meet the target and create export opportunities on the carbon market. The 
gains from a carbon market are importa
the factors of 2.9 and 2.3 respectively.  
Asia remains the dominant supplier of CDM credits with 76%, but the distribution within Asia changes: 
the contribution of India decreases to 11% and the share of China decreases to 49%. The total profit 
for CDM host countries increases and reaches 10 billion €, which is 10 times the profit of 2010. We 
also notice that the industry sector of ex-JI countries is short of allowances, but the reductions are 
cheap enough to have these countries red
Studying of the fundamentals of the emerging carbon market requires quite a lot of assumptions for 
the worldwide carbon supply and demand flows in the future. To produce a consistent and realistic 
assessment we employed sources such as: second NAPs under ETS, GHG National Inventories, EIA 









































7made difficult by a number of variables: the quantity of ‘hot air’ and the availability of project-based 
credits, for which reasonable assumptions have also to be performed throughout the study.  
The resulting sectoral and country based CO2 endowments for 2010 and 2020 imply an important 
burden to European and other Annex-B countries’ energy sector that is to say primarily the electricity 
sector. However, the sectoral analyses based on marginal abatement costs curves show that the 
power sector is also the most flexible and reacts highly to the increases in carbon price: in the short 
term via the switching opportunities and in the long term via the investments in less carbon intensive 
capital. Weak reduction targets, along with low marginal abatement costs prevail in the European and 
other Annex-B countries’ industry sectors. In ETS, the domestic reductions in industry are much larger 
than the purchases of project-based credits in 2010 and especially in 2020.  
However, the benefits of enlarged carbon market for ETS participants are important in terms of cost 
reduction and CO2 price; without the import of 146 MtCO2 CDM credits into the ETS in 2010, the CO2 
price would jump to 39€/tCO2, instead of 14€/tCO2 with the CDM credits. The economic benefits of the 
international carbon market are less evident on the countries level since more than 50% of Kyoto 
targets are accomplished by non-ETS sectors. In the long term, the study emphasizes the important 
gains from an enlarging carbon market for all participants, especially the European countries since the 
major reduction should be achieved in ETS sectors. 
In the short term, the role of ‘hot air’ is a major factor influencing the volatility of the carbon price and 
its full availability on the market would dampen the European and the rest Annex-B countries’ demand 
combined. It is however unlikely, that JI host-countries will be willing to sell their allowances at zero 
costs, and they will limit the amount on the market. Moreover, a number of countries have now 
committed themselves to not purchasing allowances attached to ‘hot air’.  
Typically, the marginal abatement costs are highest for the non-ETS sectors: transport and to lesser 
extent building sectors. The recent decision of European council to reduce the primary energy 
consumption by 20% as well as to increase the renewable energy production by 20% in 2020 would 
also allow exploiting emissions reduction opportunities in these sectors. The interactions between 
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Annex 1: Poles model and reference scenario 
POLES is a partial equilibrium world simulation model for the energy sector (Criqui and Kouvaritakis, 
2000, Criqui and Viguier, 2000). It works in a year-by-year recursive simulation with endogenous 
international energy prices and lagged adjustments of supply and demand by world region. The model 
enables to produce:  
-  Detailed long term (2100) world energy outlooks with demand, supply and price projections by 
main region; 
- CO2 emission Marginal Abatement Cost curves by region and/or sector, and emission trading 
systems analyses, under different market configurations and trading rules; 
-  Technology improvement scenarios – with exogenous or endogenous technological change – 
and analyses of the value of technological progress in the context of CO2 abatement policies (LEPII-
EPE, 2005). 
The reference scenario used to produce the marginal abatement cost curves describes a world that 
would develop on the basis of the economic fundamentals and technical constraints. Projecting long-
term energy profiles involves a large number of assumptions. World population is expected to increase 
from 6.5 billions today to 8.9 billions in 2050 with a marked decrease in average growth, which is due 
to the demographic transition and to stabilize in the second half of the century. The rate of economic 









































7emerging economies falls significantly after 2010, while conversely it accelerates in Africa and the 
Middle East. As a result, global economic growth is expected progressively to slow from 3.5%/yr in the 
1990-2010 period to 2.9%/yr between 2010 and 2030 and then 2.2%/yr until 2050. Total world GDP in 
2050 is four times the present GDP. The US Geological Survey is the base source of information used 
for oil and gas Ultimate Recoverable Resources. It provides a set of estimates and attached 
probabilities that are consistent on a world and region-by-region basis. Technological developments 
regarding energy technology costs and performances are derived from a dedicated database 
TECHPOL
13, which allows maximizing the consistency of the exogenous hypotheses for the different 
time horizons and across the different technologies. 



























EU-25 -20  
Source: German Institute for Economic Research, 2007 
                                                       
13 developed in the framework of European projects: FP6 SAPIENTIA and CASCADE-MINTS. 
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